Following are a list of relative titles and abstracts of documents recently received by the library through the federal library depository program.

The CIA has only rarely declassified and made available to the public and to scholars Cold War records of recent vintage, and this declassification and release of documents marks a new state in the CIA's commitment to openness. This process began when Director of Central intelligence Robert Gates in February 1992 made a public commitment that CIA would undertake a declassification review of all National Intelligence Estimates on the Soviet Union 10 years old or older, and by 1993 CIA had released and transferred to the National Archives several hundred Estimates on the Soviet Union, largely dealing with nonstrategic matters. As the official intelligence community position on a topic, an estimate is the most authoritative analytic product the community produces. An estimate brings together every piece of evidence the community has, records the community's agreed judgments, sets forth dissenting views when appropriate, and creates a formal record of what the community advised policymakers at the time.

The following five items are CIA declassified documents.

CIA DOCUMENTS ON THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS.
PREX 3.17:C 89 (in the microfiche collection), 376 pages, 1962.

The collection in this volume includes many of the CIA's most important documents on the Cuban missile crisis. It contains the "honeymoon cables" that Director of Central Intelligence, John A. McCone sent to headquarters from France a month before the missile crisis, as well as his notes taken during the National Security Council meetings at the height of the crisis. It also includes intelligence memos and estimates, briefing papers, Cuban refugee reports and memos on Operation MONGOOSE, the clandestine program aimed at destabilizing the Castro regime.

CIA COLD WAR RECORDS, SELECTED ESTIMATES ON THE SOVIET UNION, 1950-1959.
PREX 3.17:ES 8 (in the microfiche collection), 298 pages, 1950-1959.

This collection of declassified intelligence estimates follows the "CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis" referenced above. It publishes 27 estimates-Special Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates-that the Office of National Estimates prepared from 1950-1959. Originally classified as "Top Secret" or "Secret", the estimates offer a unique insight into how the Intelligence Community perceived and appraised the USSR.

AT COLD WAR'S END; US INTELLIGENCE ON THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE,
1989-1991.
PREX 3.2:C 67, 378 pages, 1999.

The last great drama of the Cold War-the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the end of the four-decade-old East-West conflict-unfolded in three acts between 1989 and 1991. Act one began as the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev made the largest opening to the outside world in Russian history by granting major concessions on arms control, withdrawing Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and pledging to reduce Soviet ground forces by half a million. The second act of the drama began in the fall of 1989 with peaceful revolutions in Eastern and Central Europe and the fall of the Soviet "outer empire", and the third and final act closed with the 1991 dissolution of the USSR. The National Intelligence estimates and other intelligence assessments reprinted here reveal publicly for the first time how the rapidly unfolding events led to the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War.

ASSESSING THE SOVIET THREAT: THE EARLY COLD WAR YEARS.
PREX 3.17:AS 7, 466 pages, 1997.

The documents in this volume date from 1946 to 1950. During this formative period of the Cold War, President Harry S. Truman struggled to understand the menacing behavior of the Soviet Union and his erstwhile ally, Joseph Stalin. It features the current intelligence that went to the President in the "Daily and Weekly Summaries". Taken as a whole, this volume provides the first comprehensive survey of CIA's early analysis of the Soviet threat.

INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES: ESTIMATES ON SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES, 1950-1983.
PREX 3.17:IN 8, 504 pages, 1996.

The documents in this volume, a selection of 41 National Intelligence Estimates on Soviet strategic capabilities and intentions from the 1950's until 1983, exemplify intelligence thinking on the "Bomber Gap," 1955-58; the "Missile Gap," 1957-61; Soviet strategic force development, 1960-1972, and arms control, Soviet objectives and force planning from 1968-83.